Fire Incident on Seoul Subway Line 5 Avoids Casualties

On the morning of May 31, a fire broke out on a train of Seoul's Line 5, reminiscent of the tragic 2003 Daegu subway fire, which was also caused by arson. However, the aftermath of this incident was markedly different. The train involved in the recent fire, unlike the one from the Daegu disaster, suffered minimal damage due to significant safety improvements made over the past two decades. The left image shows the aftermath of the Daegu incident, where only the metal frame remained after the fire consumed the train. In contrast, the Line 5 train (right image) was largely intact, thanks to the use of fire-resistant materials in its construction following the lessons learned from the Daegu tragedy.

The fire on Line 5 could have resulted in a disaster similar to the Daegu incident, which claimed the lives of 192 passengers due to a fire that engulfed 12 train cars. In this recent incident, however, only 23 out of approximately 400 passengers suffered minor injuries from smoke inhalation.

Safety experts attribute the successful outcome to improvements in both the subway's hardware and the public's awareness. They noted that the lessons learned from the Daegu fire played a crucial role in saving lives this time around.

In the wake of the Daegu tragedy, the government and local authorities invested around 340 billion KRW to upgrade the interior materials of subway cars to non-combustible and flame-retardant materials. This upgrade prevented the fire from spreading to the seats, even after the arsonist poured gasoline on the floor and ignited it.

The train's operator promptly followed emergency protocols, notifying the control center and making announcements to passengers. Together with the passengers, they used fire extinguishers to combat the flames. The control center also halted the following train to ensure passengers could safely evacuate through the underground tunnel. The Seoul Transportation Corporation has been conducting fire response drills every three to four months since the Daegu incident, which proved effective in this case.

Public awareness has also improved. Passengers quickly alerted the train operator about the fire using the emergency phone inside the car and utilized the emergency exit mechanisms to escape.

In stark contrast, during the Daegu incident, flammable materials like polyurethane foam fueled the fire and emitted toxic gases, leading to most of the 192 fatalities being attributed to asphyxiation. The train operator at that time failed to notify the control center and evacuated first, leaving passengers without access to fire extinguishers or emergency exits.

The recent fire occurred around 8:43 AM as the train departed from Yeouinaru Station towards Mapo Station. A man in his sixties suddenly poured gasoline on the floor and ignited it, causing smoke to fill the car within seconds. Witnesses reported that the smoke filled the train in less than ten seconds.

Fortunately, the fire did not spread to the seats due to the use of non-combustible materials in the train's construction, including aluminum walls, synthetic rubber flooring, and polycarbonate seats, which are known for their fire-resistant properties. Following the Daegu incident, regulations were amended to mandate the use of such materials in subway cars.

In contrast, the Daegu subway was constructed with highly flammable materials, allowing the fire to spread rapidly, leaving passengers with little time to escape. Toxic gases also contributed to the high death toll, with authorities stating that most victims succumbed to asphyxiation.

After the Daegu tragedy, fire response protocols and systems were established, and regular training sessions were implemented. The operator of the recent incident, identified as A, acted according to a training drill conducted just a month prior, which simulated a smoke-filled train scenario. A reported that despite fearing for his life, he felt compelled to assess the situation and extinguish the fire.

In the Daegu incident, the absence of such protocols exacerbated the situation. The operator's lack of situational awareness led to ineffective communication with the control center, which only learned of the emergency through delayed reports from station staff. This resulted in subsequent trains entering the already dangerous area without prior warning.

In the recent incident, passengers effectively communicated the fire to the operator, allowing for immediate action. Fire officials confirmed that the combined efforts of the passengers and the operator extinguished the flames before firefighters arrived. Passengers also used the emergency exit mechanisms to escape, which automatically halted the train. Reports indicated that many passengers remained calm and utilized the emergency exits, with some even assisting others in evacuating.

While there were fire extinguishers and emergency exits available during the Daegu incident, most passengers were unable to use them effectively, leading to tragic outcomes. In this recent incident, approximately 60% of the train's 64 doors were opened by passengers, indicating a heightened awareness of emergency procedures. However, concerns remain about the potential dangers of improperly opening train doors in emergency situations.

The Daegu subway disaster occurred on February 18, 2003, at 9:55 AM, when a fire ignited inside a train at Jungangno Station, ultimately spreading to the platform and subsequent trains, resulting in a significant loss of life. This tragedy prompted the establishment of the Disaster Safety Basic Act and the formation of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, leading to a comprehensive overhaul of the national safety system.